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We study patterns of FDI in a multi-country world economy. First, we present evidence for a broad
sample of countries that firms direct FDI disproportionately to markets with income levels similar
to their home market. Then we develop a model featuring non-homothetic preferences for quality and
monopolistic competition in which specialization is purely demand-driven and the decision to serve
foreign countries via exports or FDI depends on a proximity-concentration trade-off. We characterize
the joint patterns of trade and FDI when countries differ in income distribution and size and show
that FDI is more likely to occur between countries with similar per capita income levels. The model





















The Linder hypothesis seeks to explain patterns of international trade. Linder (1961) conjectured
that robust local demands for a good induce investments in productive capacity, which in turn give
rise to exports. Due to such ￿home-market e⁄ects￿(to use the term coined by Krugman, 1980),
countries will trade intensively with others that share similar consumption patterns. Moreover, to
the extent that demands for many goods are non-homothetic, intensive trade between countries
that have similar demand structures implies intensive trade between countries that have similar
levels of per capita income. Accordingly, Linder o⁄ered an early explanation for the high volumes
of trade between and among the high-income countries.1
More recently, Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) have pursued a ￿product-quality
view￿ of the Linder hypothesis. This view builds on evidence presented by Schott (2004) and
Hummels and Klenow (2005) that richer countries tend to export goods of higher unit value within
narrowly de￿ned product categories and evidence from Hallak (2006) that exporters dispropor-
tionately direct their higher-priced goods to higher-income markets. Also, Bils and Klenow (2001)
highlighted a strong positive correlation between household income and the average price paid by
the household for goods within product groups. If high unit values are an indication of high quality,
then together this evidence suggests a world in which countries with more high-income consumers
demand more of the higher quality goods and also specialize in their production.2 Fajgelbaum et
al. (2011) incorporate trade costs into a model in which non-homothetic preferences imply that
higher-income groups consume goods of higher average quality to generate predictions about the
trade pattern. Their predictions mirror those of the Linder hypothesis. Hallak (2010) presents
evidence in keeping with such predictions using industry-level data.
So far, the product-quality approach to the Linder hypothesis, and work related to the Linder
hypothesis more generally, has only been concerned with explaining trade patterns. Yet the key
forces in these approaches might also be important for understanding global patterns of foreign
direct investment (FDI). A prominent view of the determinants of FDI is that ￿rms￿decisions
about how to serve foreign markets re￿ ect a ￿proximity-concentration tradeo⁄￿(Markusen, 1984).
In the presence of trading costs, ￿rms are more likely to serve foreign markets from local production
facilities when those markets are large.3 A product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis suggests
that market size will vary with per capita income and product quality, which may therefore in￿ uence
1Numerous papers have found evidence consistent with the Linder hypothesis, e.g. Thursby and Thursby (1989),
Bergstrand (1990), Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Fieler (2011). Markusen (1986) is an early example of a formal
theory featuring a form of the Linder e⁄ect. In his model, rich capital-abundant countries trade intensely among
themselves due to increasing returns to scale and a high income-elasticity of demand for the capital intensive good.
2Using a methodology that does not rely on unit values as the sole proxy for product quality, Hallak and Schott
(2011) also show that richer countries specialize in the production of higher quality goods.
3By many accounts, market size￿ along with trading costs and scale economies￿ is an important determinant of
FDI ￿ ows and sales by foreign subsidiaries. See, for example, Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and
Maskus (2002), Helpman et al. (2004) and Yeaple (2009).
1the circumstances under which foreign investment is a more likely outcome than international trade.
In this paper we combine a quality view of the Linder hypothesis and a proximity-versus-
concentration view of ￿rms￿decision about how to serve foreign markets. We extend the model in
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) to allow for a¢ liate sales by multinational corporations. As in our earlier
paper, consumers make discrete choices of a horizontally and vertically di⁄erentiated product. Each
consumer has an idiosyncratic evaluation of each of the available varieties of the di⁄erentiated
product and some positive fraction of consumers at any income level purchases every available
brand. However, preferences are such that the fraction of consumers that opts for one of the
higher quality varieties rises with income. It follows that, in equal-sized countries with di⁄erent
distributions of income, the aggregate demand for the set of higher quality varieties will be greater
in the market with more of the high-income consumers. The presence of trading costs generates a
home-market e⁄ect that governs the pattern of specialization. In this setting, we add an option to
serve foreign markets via either exports or subsidiary sales. Firms face a constant per unit cost of
exporting and a ￿xed cost of setting up a foreign production facility, so their choice about how to
serve a given market features the familiar proximity-concentration tradeo⁄. To study the patterns
of trade and FDI that can arise, we need an environment with multiple countries at each level of
income. We adopt the simplest such setting, which has two countries in the North and two in the
South.
We are interested in understanding the circumstances under which ￿rms in a country will choose
to serve some foreign markets by exports and others by subsidiary sales. We ￿nd that a systematic
bias characterizes the possible equilibrium con￿gurations. When the pairs of countries in each
region are symmetric, North-to-North FDI or South-to-South FDI must occur in any equilibrium
that features multinational investment. Moreover, in our baseline case with equal numbers of
consumers in all countries, if the income distribution in each Northern country dominates that in
each Southern country, multinationals from the North specialize in producing high-quality products
while multinationals from the South specialize in producing low-quality products. This result
re￿ ects the combined forces of the home-market e⁄ect and the proximity-concentration tradeo⁄.
The former implies that countries tend to specialize in goods with large domestic markets. With
non-homothetic preferences, these are likely to be higher quality goods in countries with many
high-income consumers and lower quality goods in countries with many low-income consumers. The
latter implies that ￿rms are more likely to serve foreign markets via sales of foreign a¢ liates when
the destination market is larger. Together, these forces imply that ￿rms may serve destinations
that have a similar demand composition to their home market via FDI and destinations that have
a di⁄erent demand composition from their home market via export sales. If demand composition
comports with the level and distribution of income, then FDI ￿ ows may be especially intense among
countries that are at a similar stage of development.
In short, the combination of a quality view of the Linder hypothesis and a proximity-versus-
concentration view of ￿rms￿decision about how to serve foreign markets delivers a Linder hypothesis
for FDI. This prediction ￿nds support in the evidence presented by Brainard (1997). She has
2documented that the share of foreign a¢ liate sales in total sales by U.S. ￿rms falls with the di⁄erence
in per capita income between the destination market and that in the United States. In other words,
the response of multinational sales to income gaps is more pronounced than that for export sales.4
In the next section, we provide some additional evidence on the pattern of FDI and the pattern
of subsidiary sales. Using data for a broad sample of countries, we show that both the volume
of subsidiary sales and the stock of FDI originating in some country and destined for another are
negatively related to the di⁄erence in per capita income between the pair, after controlling for ￿xed
e⁄ects in the origin and destination countries and the geographic distance between them. Our
model might also help us to understand the recent rise in South-to-South FDI.5 For example, the
Boston Consulting Group (2006) has reported that 28 of the largest 100 Southern multinationals
have been motivated to invest abroad in order to ￿tak[e] their established home-market product
lines and brands to global markets.￿These ￿rms, which are concentrated in consumer durables such
as electronics and household appliances, produce goods for which arguably there are substantial
quality di⁄erences between output in the North and the South, and, with their lower unit values,
they can target a clientele that is not too di⁄erent from that in their native market.
A vast literature before us has studied the determinants of foreign direct investment. What
distinguishes our theory is its emphasis on explaining a bias in FDI towards countries at a similar
stage of development. Having more than one product for which FDI may occur as well as multiple
countries is critical for this result: FDI turns out to be more likely across similar-income coun-
tries because these countries endogenously specialize in similar-quality products. A literature on
￿vertical￿FDI, emanating from Helpman (1984), studies ￿rms￿decision to break down stages of
production that di⁄er in factor intensity across locations that di⁄er in factor prices. Naturally,
this strand is ill-suited to generate the equilibrium bias in FDI that we ￿nd. On the other hand,
Markusen and Venables (2000) extend the Helpman and Krugman (1985) set-up with trade costs to
allow for a proximity-concentration tradeo⁄. Theirs is a Hecksher-Ohlin model with two countries,
where increasing returns to scale and FDI are allowed in only one industry. Their theory predicts
that FDI is more likely to arise the more similar are the factor endowments of the two countries,
but they are unable to distinguish between regional or cross-regional FDI. Finally, recent multi-
country Ricardian models that feature the proximity-concentration tradeo⁄, such as Helpman et al.
(2004) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), are able to generate regional FDI, but present
no systematic bias in favor of North-to-North or South-to-South ￿ ows or endogenous specialization
in di⁄erent products. In these environments, FDI predominantly ￿ ows from countries that host
more productive ￿rms to countries that have relatively larger markets.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present some simple,
motivating evidence. We display the average income of the destination country for FDI and for
4Carr et al. (2001) show that convergence in GDP between the United States and any host country tends to
increase a¢ liate sales in both directions.
5Whereas only 15% of foreign investment ￿ ows to developing countries emanated from the South in 1995, Aykut
and Ratha (2004) report that almost 40% of such ￿ ows now have origins in the other emerging markets.
6Institutional similarities among developing countries have also been proposed as an explanation for the recent
surge in South-South FDI. See Dixit (2011).
3subsidiary sales of a broad range of source countries, and we show how these ￿ ows correlate with
the absolute value of the di⁄erence in per capita income between origin and destination markets. In
Section 3, we present our multi-country model of trade that includes non-homothetic preferences,
monopolistic competition, and the proximity-versus-concentration tradeo⁄. In Section 4, we ￿nd
conditions for FDI in a given product across country-pairs, taking as given the market size for
that product in each country. We show that there is a bias towards FDI ￿ ows between countries
with similarly sized markets for goods of a given quality level. Section 5 characterizes the global
pattern of specialization and FDI in goods with di⁄erent quality when countries di⁄er in their
income distributions and number of consumers. We present parameter con￿gurations that give
rise to Northern multinationals in high-quality goods and Southern multinationals in low-quality
products. Section 6 concludes.
2 Some Motivating Evidence on Bilateral Patterns of FDI
Ramondo (2011) has assembled data on revenues from sales in country j by foreign a¢ liates of ￿rms
based in country i, on accumulated stocks of foreign investment, and on other variables relating to
bilateral FDI and foreign a¢ liate activity for 151 countries at di⁄erent levels of development for the
period from 1990 to 2002. We use these data to develop some motivating facts about the patterns
of FDI and subsidiary sales. We are particularly interested in how these bilateral relationships
re￿ ect the similarity or di⁄erence in the per capita levels of the source and destination countries.7
In Figure 1, we plot on the horizontal axis the log of the average per capita income during the
1990￿ s for the 129 (source) countries in the Ramondo data set that report positive stocks of outward
FDI during the period. On the vertical axis we plot the log of the weighted average per capita
income in the destination countries for this accumulated FDI, where the weights are the shares
of each of the destination countries in the total stock of FDI originating in the particular source
country. The ￿gure shows clearly that ￿rms based in rich countries tend to locate their foreign
a¢ liates in richer destination markets than do ￿rms based in poor countries.8 For example, the
average per capita income in destination countries for FDI originating in the United States, France
and Japan was $17,717, $22,108, and $19,396, respectively, whereas for Chile, India and Russia it
was $7025, $8419 and $11,882. Meanwhile, Kenya and Nigeria directed their FDI to countries with
weighted average per capita incomes of $570 and $2398, respectively.
Table 1 shows the results from a regression of the log of the average stock of bilateral FDI
during the period from 1990 to 2000 on the absolute value of the log di⁄erence in per capita income
between the origin and destination countries, the log of the geographic distance between the origin
7We are grateful to Natalia Ramondo for sharing these data with us and for advising us on details of how they
were constructed.
8In a similar vein, the UNCTAD (2006) reports data on the FDI ￿ows emanating from developing countries.They
documents a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the share of developing economies in total FDI in￿ ows.
For example, between 2002 and 2004, between 70% and 80% of FDI ￿ ows into low-income countries such as China,
Thailand or Paraguay originated from developing countries, while less than 20% did so in Switzerland, Japan or the
United States (see UNCTAD 2006, Fig III.9, p.120).
4Figure 1: Per Capita Income for Source and Destination Countries for FDI
and destination countries, ￿xed e⁄ects for the origin and destination countries, and a constant, for
the 2593 dyads that report positive stocks of FDI during the decade. The coe¢ cient on the income
gap variable is -0.36, with a standard error of .06. That is, a 10% increase in the ratio of per capita
incomes between the origin and destination countries is associated with a 3.6% smaller stock of
FDI from one to the other, after controlling for the ￿xed characteristics of the countries as sources
of and destinations for FDI, and for their geographic proximity. The table also shows the results
from a similar regression using data for revenues from foreign a¢ liate sales for the smaller number
of 820 dyads that report such sales. The estimated coe¢ cient on the log income di⁄erence is -0.64
in this regression, with a standard error of 0.28.
The patterns revealed by the Ramondo data on FDI and a¢ liate sales, along with the earlier
evidence for the United States provided by Brainard (1997) suggest that ￿rms are more likely to
serve via FDI those foreign markets that have similar per capita income to their home market
compared to markets that have very di⁄erent levels of per capita income. We now present a model
of FDI featuring non-homothetic preferences for goods of di⁄erent quality to explain why this might
be so.
3 The Model
We study a world economy comprising four countries, two in the North and two in the South.
We index the countries by k 2 fR1;R2;P1;P2g. The pair of Northern countries, R1 and R2,
have higher per capita incomes than do the pair of Southern countries, P1 and P2. We include
four countries in our model in order to study foreign direct investment within and across levels of
5Table 1: Patterns of Bilateral FDI
Log of Average Stock
of FDI, 1990-1999
Log of Average Revenues from
Foreign A¢ liate Sales, 1990-1999
Absolute Di⁄. in











No. of Observations 2523 820
R2 .76 .84
Note: Regressions include ￿xed e⁄ects for origin and destination countries and constants.
Standard errors in parentheses.
development. For ease of exposition, we refer to the North and South as ￿regions￿ , even though
we adopt a symmetric geography in which it is equally costly to ship goods between any pair of
countries.
Each country is populated by a continuum of households. A household is endowed with one unit
of labor of some productivity. We take the distribution of labor productivity in each country as
given and denote by Gk (y) the fraction of households in country k that has productivity less than
or equal to y. Let Nk be the measure of households residing in country k, so that Nk R
ydGk (y) is
the aggregate supply of e⁄ective labor there.
3.1 Supply
In every country, competitive ￿rms can produce a homogeneous, numeraire good with one unit of
e⁄ective labor per unit of output. This good can be shipped internationally at zero cost. Labor
supplies are such that every country produces the numeraire good in positive quantity. This pins
down the common, global wage for e⁄ective labor and it implies that a household with y units of
e⁄ective labor has a labor income of y. Since there are no pro￿ts in the equilibria that we study,
Gk (y) gives the distribution of income in country k.
Agents in any country can access a common technology for producing a set of di⁄erentiated
products. These goods can be produced in two di⁄erent quality levels, H and L, with H > L.
At each quality level, the market delivers a discrete (and endogenous) number of horizontally-
di⁄erentiated varieties. In order to produce a good of quality q, a ￿rm must bear a ￿xed cost of fq
(i.e., it needs to hire fq units of e⁄ective labor) and a variable cost of cq per unit of output, with
fH ￿ fL and cH ￿ cL. We denote by Jq the set of varieties with quality q and by J ￿ JH [JL the
set of all available varieties.
A ￿rm can serve its home market at no additional marketing cost. The ￿rm has two options
for supplying any foreign market. It can export a di⁄erentiated product with quality q by paying
￿q per unit in international shipping costs. Alternatively, it can open a plant in a foreign country
6and produce there for local sales, or indeed for sales to anywhere in the world. A subsidiary incurs
no shipping costs for local sales in the country where the plant is located, but sales from an export
platform bear the same shipping costs ￿q as do other export sales. A ￿rm must pay hq in plant ￿xed
costs for each of its foreign subsidiaries. The choice of FDI versus exporting entails the familiar,
proximity-concentration tradeo⁄, as in Brainard (1993) and Horstmann and Markusen (1992).
3.2 Demand
Each household demands exactly one unit of some variety of the di⁄erentiated product. A household
h that consumes z units of the homogenous good and chooses variety j 2 Jq of the di⁄erentiated
product achieves utility
uh
j = zq + "h
j; (1)
where "h
j is the household￿ s idiosyncratic evaluation of the attributes of that variety. Each household





of such taste parameters. A household maximizes utility by making a
discrete choice of some particular variety in some quality segment and by spending its residual
income on the homogeneous good. We assume that, in every country, even the household with
the least income can a⁄ord to purchase the most expensive brand of the di⁄erentiated product.
In every country, the vectors "h are distributed independently across households according to the
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution,








; with 0 < ￿L < ￿H < 1.
In Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), we discussed how aggregate demands are derived from these





for all products sold in country k; in so doing, we followed
the methods developed by McFadden (1978) and others. As is well known from the literature on























i￿! for j 2 Jq, q = fH;Lg:
where ￿k
j (y) is the fraction of households with income y that chooses variety j in country k at the
given prices. Variation in the spending pattern across income groups in a country arises solely from
variation in the fraction of individuals who purchase the products at di⁄erent levels of quality q, as
re￿ ected by the functions ￿k
j(y). As shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2009), the fraction of individuals
who purchase high-quality products rises with income at all income levels. Aggregate demands for
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dGk (y) , (2)
where dk
j is the demand for brand j 2 Jq in country k. The reader will recognize (2) as a nested
logit system of aggregate demands.
3.3 Pricing and Pro￿ts
Each ￿rm that produces some variety of the di⁄erentiated product sells its output to consumers
worldwide. The ￿rm can choose di⁄erent prices in each market although in fact it has no incentive
to discriminate in its f.o.b. prices. A ￿rm that produces a variety j 2 Jq in country k faces
aggregate demand dk
j in its home market and a unit cost of cq. We assume that the number of
active producers in each quality segment is large and that monopolistic competition prevails. As
is common in settings with monopolistic competition, the fact that there are many competitors
means that ￿rms can ignore the in￿ uence of their own price decisions on the terms in the various
sums in (2). As we have shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), the pro￿t-maximizing price for local
sales entails a ￿xed markup ￿q=q over marginal cost.
Each ￿rm in country k serves the foreign market in another country k0 either with exports or
with goods produced in a subsidiary there, but not both. Firms with subsidiaries in k0 face the
same demand and cost conditions as local producers, so they too price at a markup ￿q=q over their
unit cost of cq: Firms that export to country k0 face a higher cost per sale of cq + ￿q that includes
a shipping charge. So, they price at a markup ￿q=q over this higher, delivered cost. In short,
households in any country k face at most two prices for the varieties in Jq, the price pd
q that is
charged for all locally-produced goods and the price pm
q that is attached to imports. These prices
are common across countries and given by
pd










for q = H;L: (3)
The markups vary positively with the ￿dissimilarity￿parameter ￿q for goods in Jq and negatively
with the quality level itself. A high value for ￿q implies that goods in Jq are imperfect substitutes
in aggregate demand, in the sense that the idiosyncratic tastes for any pair of these goods are little
correlated. This makes for an inelastic demand for a given variety and thus a large markup. The
direct e⁄ect of quality is to raise households￿marginal utility of spending on the homogeneous good,
which makes them more sensitive to prices and thus induces a lower markup. Taken together, these
considerations imply a higher markup for high-quality products than for low-quality goods if and
only if ￿H=H > ￿L=L; see Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) for further discussion.
8Sales of locally-produced goods of quality q in country k (be they domestic brands or those
of foreign subsidiaries) re￿ ect the prices of these goods, the prices of competing imports, and the
numbers of locally-produced and imported varieties at each quality level. Let dk
q represent the
aggregate demand by domestic consumers for a typical good of quality q produced in country k by
a domestic ￿rm or by a foreign subsidiary, when all goods are priced according to (3). Then the



























￿q (y) ￿ e(y￿cq)q￿￿q;
nk
q is the number of varieties of goods of quality q produced in country k, n
m;k
q is the number
of varieties of goods of quality q imported into country k, and Ek is the expectation operator
with respect to the income distribution in country k. The aggregate sales in country k of a typical
imported variety with quality q are a fraction ￿q of sales by local producers. The number of products
nk
q consists of goods produced by domestic ￿rms in country k, n
d;k
q , and goods produced by foreign
subsidiaries in country k, n
s;k





q . The number n
m;k
q includes exporters from
as many as three source countries and similarly, the number n
s;k
q includes FDI in k from as many
as three parent countries. We refer to ~ nk
q as the ￿e⁄ective￿number of competitors in the market
segment for quality q in country k, after taking into account the equilibrium pricing induced by the
positive transport costs; i.e., after appropriately discounting the number of imported varieties.
All ￿rms that produce a variety with quality q earn the same variable pro￿ts of ￿q=q per unit
sold. A domestic ￿rm in country k makes local sales of dk
q and pays no ￿extra￿￿xed costs. Its
variable pro￿ts in its home market are the product of its sales and the mark-up. A foreign ￿rm
with a subsidiary in k makes these same sales, but pays a ￿xed cost for its foreign plants of hq.
Its pro￿ts in the market are those of the domestic ￿rm less the ￿xed cost of the subsidiary. An
exporter to country k bears no extra ￿xed cost for selling there, but its sales in country k are only
￿q times as large as those of a typical, local producer. Thus, we can express pro￿ts from sales in
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for q = H;L and all k. (5)
Of course, each foreign ￿rm chooses its mode for serving market k by comparing potential pro￿ts
9from exporting ￿
x;k
q with potential pro￿ts from subsidiary sales, ￿
s;k
q ; a ￿rm that produces a variety








q , and it is
indi⁄erent otherwise. The maximum global pro￿t attainable by a ￿rm with headquarters in country













We assume that there is free entry into the market for di⁄erentiated products, so that ￿‘
q = 0
in an equilibrium in which a positive number of ￿rms that produce goods with quality q are
headquartered in country ‘, and ￿‘
q ￿ 0 in an equilibrium in which no ￿rms that produce goods
with this quality are headquartered there.9
3.4 Equilibrium

















exporting to country k a






with a foreign subsidiary situated in country k








q for all k and q, and
(i) given the numbers and organizational choices of all ￿rms, local market potentials satisfy (4);


















, the numbers of entrants in each market and market segment
are consistent with free entry; i.e.,
nd;k
q > 0 ) ￿k
q = 0 and nd;k
q = 0 ) ￿k
q ￿ 0.
The ￿market potential￿dk
q measures the number of sales that a local producer of some variety with
quality q could capture in country k, considering the number and location of its competitors, the
optimal pricing decision by the ￿rm and all its rivals, and the overall size of the market.
In what follows, we consider ￿rst a world economy in which R1 and R2 are a pair of symmetric
countries and P1 and P2 also are symmetric. In other words, we suppose that each region comprises
two countries that are identical in all relevant respects. We do allow the distribution of income
9Actually, the integer constraint on the numbers of ￿rms allows for (small) positive pro￿ts in equilibrium, so long
as a potential entrant in any market segment and country would break even or su⁄er losses. In what follows, we
neglect this detail, and treat the numbers of ￿rms as continuous variables that generate zero pro￿ts for active ￿rms
in all countries and quality segments.
10and the population size to di⁄er between North and South. For the case of symmetric countries
within each region, we can drop the subscripts 1 and 2 from the countries and use R to indicate a
typical (rich) country in the North and P to indicate a typical (poor) country in the South. With
this notation in place, the net pro￿ts of a ￿rm headquartered in country k that produces a brand































for q = H;L, k;‘ = R;P and ‘ 6= k: Following our analysis of the symmetric case in the next two
sections, we shall discuss some consequences of asymmetries between the countries in a region.
4 Place of Entry and Conditions for FDI
We are interested in where ￿rms enter in each quality segment and how the active producers choose
to serve their various foreign markets. In this section, we will focus on the pro￿tability conditions
that determine the place of entry and mode of organization. We will ask, What combinations of
market potentials, dR
q and dP
q ; are consistent with zero pro￿ts for active ￿rms, non-positive pro￿ts
for potential entrants, and optimal organization of production by all ￿rms? In other words, we will
identify the combinations of dR
q and dP
q that satisfy the requirements (ii) and (iii) in the de￿nition
of an equilibrium that we gave in Section 3.4, without considering for the time being which ones
are also consistent with the demand system, as stipulated in requirement (i). In so doing, we
are able to establish and explain a general bias in favor of North-to-North and South-to-South
multinationals. In the next section, we will impose requirement (i) in order to fully characterize
the general equilibrium.
Let us focus on the market for di⁄erentiated products with quality q and omit the subscript q
whenever it causes no confusion to do so. We de￿ne two magnitudes that will be important in the
discussion. First, let x be the volume of sales that a ￿rm would need to make in order to cover its
￿xed cost of entry. Inasmuch as ￿rms make the same pro￿t ￿=q on every sale in any of the four
markets, it follows that x = fq=￿. Second, let xs be the volume of sales that a ￿rm must make in
some foreign market in order to cover the cost of operating a subsidiary there. Then xs = hq=￿.
Note that both x and xs are derived parameters; i.e., they do not depend on any of the equilibrium
interactions in the model.
















for k;‘ = R;P and ‘ 6= k; where dk are the sales in country k of a typical product manufactured
locally and ￿dk are the sales of an imported product. Clearly, the choice between exporting to a
foreign market and opening a subsidiary is governed by a comparison of ￿dk and dk￿xs; a non-local
￿rm will serve the market in country k by exports if dk < xs=(1 ￿ ￿) and by subsidiary sales if the
11opposite inequality holds. In other words, large markets are served by foreign subsidiaries to avoid
the substantial shipping costs that would result from trade, whereas smaller markets are served by
exports because the potential cost savings from local delivery cannot justify the cost of investment










for k;‘ = R;P and ‘ 6= k; if the left-hand side of (7) falls short of x, then no ￿rms will enter in
country k in the relevant market segment.
Considering the symmetry that we have introduced, there are four possible outcomes for a
￿rm￿ s choice of how to serve its foreign markets. At one extreme, a ￿rm headquartered in some
country may choose to supply all foreign markets as an exporter. At the opposite extreme, the ￿rm
might elect to establish foreign subsidiaries in all markets; we shall refer to such a ￿rm as a global
multinational. We are, however, most interested in the conditions that give rise to the intermediate
outcomes, in which a ￿rm serves some markets with exports and others by subsidiary sales. We
refer to a ￿rm that operates a subsidiary in the other country in its own region but exports to
the two markets in the opposite region as a regional multinational. A ￿rm that exports to the
other market in its own region but operates subsidiaries in the opposite region is a cross-regional
multinational.
We now begin to identify the combinations of dR and dP that are consistent with entry in
either region (or both) and with the various organizational choices. We start with the cross-regional
multinationals, for which the conditions are most restrictive. Suppose that a ￿rm headquartered in
country k exports to country k0 in its own region, but operates a subsidiary in the two countries ‘ and
‘0 in the opposite region. Exports from k to k0 can be optimal for the ￿rm only if dk ￿ xs=(1 ￿ ￿).
Moreover, the ￿rm breaks even only if
(1 + ￿)dk + 2d‘ = x + 2xs. (8)
Of course, there can be no pure-pro￿t opportunities for a ￿rm that might enter in the same quality
segment in country ‘ and operate as a regional multinational from there, which implies that
2d‘ + 2￿dk ￿ x + xs. (9)
Together, (8) and (9) imply that dk ￿ xs=(1 ￿ ￿). Therefore, a ￿rm might enter in country k
and operate as a cross-regional multinational only if dk = xs=(1 ￿ ￿). The presence of cross-
regional multinationals based in country k also requires that d‘ ￿ xs=(1 ￿ ￿), because otherwise
the ￿rm would prefer to export to the two markets in the opposite region. In short, cross-regional
multinationals can emerge only in one of the smaller markets, and then only for a very particular
value of the market potential there.













Figure 2: Market potentials with prohibitive FDI costs: xs=x > (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿)
size of the ￿xed cost of operating a foreign subsidiary compared to the ￿xed cost of entering the
market. Note that xs=x = h=f. We say that the relative cost of FDI is prohibitive if xs=x >
(1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿), it is high if (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿) > xs=x > (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + 3￿) and it is low if xs=x <
(1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + 3￿).
Figure 2 illustrates a case in which the relative cost of FDI is prohibitive. The solid line depicts
combinations of dR and dP such that exporters in the North break even; namely, (1 + ￿)dR +
2￿dP = x. Similarly, the broken line depicts combinations of the market potentials such that
exporters in the South earn zero pro￿ts, or (1 + ￿)dP + 2￿dR = x. These are the only possible
outcomes when there is such a relatively high cost of FDI, because foreign subsidiaries can never
operate pro￿tably under such conditions.10 The equilibrium can have active ￿rms in both regions
only at point C, were dR = dP. Otherwise, the North alone will produce and export the good
in question (if dR > dP) or the South alone will do so (if dR < dP). Note, for example, that if
dR > dP and exporters in the South were to break even, then exporters in the North would have
an opportunity to make strictly positive pro￿ts.
Now consider Figure 3, which illustrates the case of a high (but not prohibitive) relative cost
of FDI. The solid line segments in the ￿gure represent combinations of dR and dP such that ￿rms
located in the North make zero pro￿ts under their most pro￿table organizational form and for
which entry in the South would be unpro￿table. Similarly, the broken line segments represent
combinations of dR and dP that yield zero pro￿ts for Southern ￿rms under their optimal choice of
exporting versus FDI and for which entry by Northern ￿rms would be unpro￿table. At point C,
all producers face similar pro￿t opportunities no matter where they are headquartered, so if ￿rms
in the North break even, ￿rms in the South do so as well.
10Suppose that a regional multinational operates in country k. Then 2d
k + 2￿d




Together, these imply (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿) ￿ x
s=x.
Now suppose that a global multinational operates in country k: Then 2d
k + 2d
‘ = x + 3x
s, d
k ￿ x
s=(1 ￿ ￿), and
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Figure 3: Market potentials with high FDI costs: (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + 3￿) < xs=x < (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿)
Notice that at point C, dR = dP < xs=(1 ￿ ￿). Point C lies on the two curves representing the
zero-pro￿t conditions for exporters in each region; i.e., at point C
(1 + ￿)dR + 2￿dP = x (10)
and
(1 + ￿)dP + 2￿dR = x; (11)
so that dR = dP = x=(1 + 3￿). The fact that, at point C, each market potential is less than
xs=(1 ￿ ￿) follows from the condition for a high relative cost of FDI. It implies that, with these
value of the market potentials, no ￿rm would ￿nd it pro￿table to open a foreign subsidiary anywhere
in the world.
Along the interior of BC, the break-even condition (10) for exporters located in a Northern
country is satis￿ed. Since all these points represent market potentials less than xs=(1 ￿ ￿) in both
markets, no Northern ￿rm would be tempted to open any foreign subsidiary. Moreover, when ￿rms
in the North break even for such values of dR and dP, ￿rms in the South cannot pro￿tably survive.
Thus, the points along BC represent possible outcomes with exporting ￿rms headquartered in the
North and no production in the South. Similarly, points along the interior of CD represent market
potentials consistent with exporting ￿rms headquartered in the South, but no entry in the North,
and no FDI.
At point B, a Northern ￿rm would be indi⁄erent between exporting to the other regional market
or operating a subsidiary there. At this point, both of these modes yield the same pro￿ts and either
could be consistent with the equilibrium requirements. The segment AB represents combinations
of dR and dP for which a regional multinational headquartered in the North makes zero pro￿ts;
i.e.,















Figure 4: Market potentials with low FDI costs: xs=x < (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + 3￿)
In the interior of this segment, Northern ￿rms strictly prefer to export to the South but also strictly
prefer to operate a subsidiary in the regional market that is not their own. Moreover, if the market
potentials are such that regional multinationals break even in the North, there will be no pro￿table
entry opportunity for any type of ￿rm in the South. The segment DE has similar properties, except
that the regional multinationals would be headquartered in the South instead of the North.
We see that three types of outcomes are possible for the case of a high cost of FDI. First,
the market potentials may be the same in all countries (point C), in which case there may be
active ￿rms in any market but all producers serve their foreign markets as exporters. Second,
entry may be con￿ned to one region (in the North along BC and in the South along CD), with
all ￿rms again serving foreign markets via trade. Finally, entry may take place in only one region
(in the North along AB and in the South along DE), with active ￿rms serving their home market
with domestic sales, the two markets in the opposite region with exports, and the market in the
remaining country in their own region with goods produced in a subsidiary there. Notice that this
last outcome exhibits FDI from North to North or from South to South, but not from North to
South.
We turn to Figure 4, which depicts the case of a low relative cost of FDI. Again, the solid line
segment indicates that ￿rms are active only in the North, whereas the broken segment indicates
that ￿rms are active only in the South. Here, there is also a dotted-and-dashed segment, which
is meant to suggest that producers may operate pro￿tably with headquarters located anywhere in
the world.
Consider ￿rst point C, where the market potentials in the two regions are the same. At this
point, dR = dP > xs=(1 ￿ ￿), so no matter where a ￿rm is headquartered, it prefers to open a
subsidiary in each of its three foreign markets than to export from the home plant to any of them.
All ￿rms operate as global multinationals, and entry is equally pro￿table in any location. But
notice, now, that the same is true all along the segment BC. As long as the market potential in
15every country exceeds xs=(1 ￿ ￿), all active ￿rms choose to be global multinationals. And global
multinationals make the same sales, earn the same revenues and pay the same ￿xed and variable
costs irrespective of their country of origin.
The segment AB in Figure 4 represents combinations of dR and dP that give rise to regional
multinationals with their headquarters in the North, while the segment DE represents combinations
for which there are regional multinationals headquartered in the South. In either case, the market
potential in a ￿rm￿ s regional foreign market exceeds the critical value that makes FDI pro￿table,
but the market potentials in the countries of the opposite region do not. In other words, segment
AB has North-to-North FDI, while segment DE has South-to-South FDI, but neither segment has
FDI that cross regional boundaries.
We summarize our ￿ndings in
Proposition 1 (a) If hq=fq < (1 ￿ ￿q)=(1 + 3￿q), there is FDI for products of quality q. Either
these goods are produced in the North and in the South and all ￿rms engage in global FDI, or one
region specializes in producing products of quality q. In the latter case, every ￿rm serves the other
country in its region with subsidiary sales while exporting to the countries in the opposite region.
(b) If hq=fq > (1 ￿ ￿q)=(1 + ￿q), there is international trade but no FDI in products of quality q.
Production may take place in one or both regions, but in either case producers export to all foreign
markets.
(c) If (1 ￿ ￿q)=(1 + ￿q) > hq=fq > (1 ￿ ￿q)=(1 + 3￿q), there is international trade in products
of quality q. FDI can occur only when production takes place in a single region, and then every
producer serves the country in its region with subsidiary sales while exporting to the countries in
the opposite region.
The proposition immediately implies
Corollary 1 If FDI takes place for products of quality q, then there must be either North-to-North
FDI or South-to-South FDI.
This corollary can help to explain the prevalence of multinational investment between and among
the industrialized countries, as well as perhaps the recent dramatic rise of Southern multinationals
operating in other developing countries. In terms of our model, the intuition is straightforward. In
a world of costly trade and foreign investment, ￿rms tend to enter into the larger markets. But
with non-homothetic demands for vertically di⁄erentiated products, the large markets for a good
of a given quality are likely to be found in countries that stand at similar levels of development.
Moreover, the proximity-concentration tradeo⁄ implies that ￿rms prefer to serve large foreign mar-
kets with FDI and small markets with exports. It follows that regional FDI often will be more
attractive to ￿rms than cross-regional FDI.
165 Patterns of Trade and FDI
In Section 4, we identi￿ed the combinations of dR and dP that are consistent with free entry and
optimal choices of exporting versus FDI by all ￿rms. Now we need to reintroduce the connection
between the numbers and organizational choices of ￿rms in each location and the sales that result
from optimal pricing in order to pin down the equilibrium values of dR and dP in each market
segment. In so doing, we can link the global patterns of FDI and trade to cost parameters, income
distributions, and population sizes, which are the fundamental determinants of trade and FDI in
our model. In all that follows, we assume that the typical country in the North is richer than the
typical country in the South, in the sense that GR (y) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates GP (y).
5.1 Fixed Costs of Foreign Direct Investment
We begin by examining the cost of foreign investment, which is captured in our model by the
parameters hH and hL. For purposes of this exercise, we will assume that all countries have the
same population size, N. We will examine the consequences of a reduction in the ￿xed cost of FDI
in one quality segment while holding that in the other segment constant.
Suppose that the ￿xed cost of FDI is prohibitive in both quality segments, using the terminology
introduced in Section 4; that is, hq=fq > (1 ￿ ￿q)=(1 + ￿q) for q = H;L. As we have noted, no
multinational investment can arise in such circumstances and the equilibrium features exporting by
all ￿rms. The trade patterns can be found by extending the reasoning developed in Fajgelbaum et
al. (2010). As we noted there, several subcases can arise. If shipping costs are high enough, they
can a⁄ord enough protection to support positive production of both low-quality and high-quality
goods in every country. A similar outcome arises for any given set of shipping costs if the income
distributions of the two regions are su¢ ciently close. If shipping costs instead are low, or the income
distributions of the two regions are far apart, each good will be produced in only one region. In
such circumstances, the home-market e⁄ect renders entry in the smaller markets unpro￿table. It is
also possible that equilibrium production in one quality segment will be diversi￿ed globally while
production in the other segment is concentrated in one region.
For the time being, let us examine the case in which, in the absence of any multinational
investment, production of goods at each quality level takes place in only one region. The arguments
from Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) readily extend to our setting with two symmetric countries in each
region. They imply that goods of quality H are produced in the countries that have the larger
markets for these goods which, with equal populations and the speci￿ed di⁄erences in income
distribution, must be the richer countries, R1 and R2. Similarly, when the ￿xed costs of FDI are
prohibitive, the goods of quality L are produced in P1 and P2. In terms of our Figure 2, the
discussion in Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) indicates that the equilibrium in the market for high-quality
goods falls somewhere along the segment BC, where dR
H > dP
H. Meanwhile, the equilibrium in the
market for low-quality goods lies somewhere along CD, where dP
L > dR
L. The Northern countries
export high-quality products to the South and the Southern countries export low-quality products
17to the North, with balanced trade between the countries in the same region.
Now suppose that the ￿xed cost of FDI falls for high-quality goods, and with it the minimum
scale for a pro￿table subsidiary. As long as hH remains su¢ ciently large that xs
H > (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H at
the dR
H of the trade-only equilibrium, then no ￿rm has any incentive to change its mode of delivery
or its prices. The equilibrium continues to feature exports as the sole means of delivery.
Once hH falls to a level at which this inequality no longer is satis￿ed at the initial dR
H, then
FDI becomes an attractive alternative to exporting for some ￿rms in the North. Let hH be such
that xs
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H at the dR
H of the trade-only equilibrium, while hL remains su¢ ciently high
that hL=fL > (1 ￿ ￿L)=(1 + ￿L). Then ￿rms that produce high-quality goods in the North are
indi⁄erent between serving the foreign market in their region with exports or by establishing a local
presence there. In Figure 3, the equilibrium now is at a point such as B in the market for high-
quality goods, and along CD in the market for low-quality goods. Initially (i.e., for the greatest
value of hH such that xs
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H) the equilibrium continues to have only exporting and
no FDI. We can see that regional multinationals must emerge in the North as the ￿xed cost of
FDI falls from that level. In this circumstance, the trade-only equilibrium is no longer sustainable
because xs
H < (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H at the trade-only value for dR
H. Furthermore, as long as the fall in hH
is not too large the economy must still be in a situation such as the one depicted in Figure 3 (i.e.,
where the relative cost of FDI is high according to our de￿nition). Therefore, an equilibrium with
regional multinationals turns out to be the only feasible outcome in this situation.
Note, further, that the equality xs
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H must continue to hold for some range of
values of hH. Otherwise, in the absence of any additional adjustments, the opening of a foreign
subsidiary would be attractive to all Northern ￿rms. But this would create a discontinuous response
in the equilibrium, which cannot happen in our setting. Instead, some fraction of the Northern
￿rms opts to establish a subsidiary in the opposite country of the North, while the remaining ￿rms
continue to export. The total number of ￿rms and the fraction in each category adjust so that
xs
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H despite the changes in hH. As hH continues to decline, the fraction of Northern
￿rms that chooses to serve the other market in the North with subsidiary sales grows, until all such
Northern ￿rms operate in this manner. Thereafter, it is no longer possible for the market potentials
to adjust so as to keep the Northern ￿rms in a state of indi⁄erence. The equilibrium eventually has
xs
H < (1 ￿ ￿H)dR
H, with all Northern ￿rms operating as regional multinationals, as represented by
a point along AB in Figure 3.11
Still further declines in the ￿xed cost of FDI will bring us to a situation like that depicted in
Figure 4. Suppose the equilibrium for high-quality goods ends up on a segment such as BD in
that ￿gure. Note that in the limit, as hH approaches zero, such an outcome is inevitable. When
11In the above considered case, in which North manufactures high-quality products and South manufactures low-
quality products, x
s
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)d
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Recall that rising values of n
s;R
H represent FDI by more Northern ￿rms.
18the equilibrium falls along the segment BD, every ￿rm producing some variety of a high-quality
product strictly prefers to serve all of its foreign markets via FDI; i.e., all producers of high-quality




H = xH + 3xs
H;
irrespective of whether a ￿rm is headquartered in the North or the South. Then, the distribution
of ￿rms across countries is not determined, although the total number of producers is unique.
We have described the possible outcomes that arise for di⁄erent relative costs of FDI hH=fH
when trade costs and income distributions are such that the trade-only equilibrium has production
of high-quality goods only in the North and production of low-quality goods only in the South.
Using similar reasoning, we can also identify the equilibria that arise for di⁄erent relative costs of
FDI when the production of both quality levels is globally diversi￿ed in the trade-only equilibrium,
i.e. when shipping costs are large or regional di⁄erences in income distributions are small. In such
circumstances, we know from (10) and (11) that dk
H = xH=(1 + 3￿) for k = R;P in the equilibrium
with prohibitive costs of FDI. As before, let us reduce hH while holding hL at a prohibitive level.
Naturally, the trade-only equilibrium with diversi￿ed production remains in place as long as hH is
above the largest hH such that xs
H = (1 ￿ ￿H)dk
H. At that exact point, we have that producers of
high-quality goods are indi⁄erent between all four organizational forms, including the possibility of
cross-regional multinationals. For values of hH below that threshold, the market for high-quality
goods must be characterized by what we have termed a low relative cost of FDI. Then, we may
have either global multinationals producing high-quality goods or regional multinationals operating
only in the North. When the trade-only equilibrium displays globally diversi￿ed production, even
￿high￿relative costs of FDI turn out to be prohibitive.
In sum, we have established
Proposition 2 Let ~ dk
H for k = R;P denote the market potentials in the trade-only equilibrium
that arises when both hH and hL are prohibitive and suppose that hL=fL > (1 ￿ ￿L)=(1 + ￿L).
Then, the equilibrium in the high-quality segment has only exporters if xs
H > (1 ￿ ￿H) ~ dR
H. If
the trade-only equilibrium has specialized regional production in both quality segments, then re-
gional multinationals operate in the North whenever (1 ￿ ￿H) ~ dR
H > xs
H > xs
H for some xs
H >
(1 ￿ ￿H)xH=(1 + 3￿H). Global multinationals operate for xs
H su¢ ciently close to zero. If the
trade-only equilibrium instead has globally diversi￿ed production of both goods, then FDI occurs
only if xs
H < (1 ￿ ￿H)xH=(1 + 3￿H).
This proposition re￿ ects the interplay between the relative ￿xed cost of FDI and di⁄erences in
income distribution between regions. When income distributions are more similar across regions
(so that the trade-only equilibrium features incomplete specialization), multinationals are less likely
to emerge. When income distributions are su¢ ciently di⁄erent, regional multinationals operate in
the North for relative costs hH=fH that could not give rise to multinational investment were the
income distributions more similar.
19Of course, the same reasoning applies to reductions in hL from an initially prohibitive level
when the ￿xed cost of FDI in the high-quality segment remains prohibitive throughout. Then, if the
trade-only equilibrium features complete regional specialization in both quality segments, regional
multinationals will appear in the South, ￿rst as a fraction of all Southern ￿rms and eventually as a
dominant means for Southern ￿rms to serve their other, large market. When hH and hL are both
su¢ ciently small, the equilibrium can be one in which all ￿rms operate as regional multinationals,
serving their larger foreign market (in the same region) from a foreign subsidiary, while exporting
to the smaller markets in the opposite regions.
In the remainder of this section, let us be a little more precise about the formal conditions under
which the various types of equilibria can arise. Suppose we conjecture that the equilibrium has
global multinationals in both market segments. As we have just noted, such multinationals￿ when
they exist￿ can operate from any home country. We can use (4) for dk
q to express the break-even




















for q = L;H;
where ￿ nq is the total number of products of quality q available in every market. The arguments
from Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) establish that these two equations have a unique solution for ￿ nL and
￿ nH, which has ￿ nL > 0 and ￿ nH > 0. But the solution for ￿ nL and ￿ nH may not be consistent with
an equilibrium on the segment BD in both the market for low-quality and high-quality products,






q for k = R;P,
as well as the condition for low costs of FDI introduced in Section 4. If the parameters and market
potentials do not fall in these ranges, then our conjecture that an equilibrium exists with global
multinationals cannot be justi￿ed.
Similarly, we can search for an equilibrium with concentrated production of high-quality goods
in the North and concentrated production of low-quality goods in the South, and with regional























































where, as before, ￿ nq is the total number of varieties with quality q produced in the world economy.
Here, the distribution of production of the high-quality goods across the two Northern countries is
not determined, nor is the distribution of production of low-quality goods across the two Southern
countries. The solution to this pair of equations characterizes an equilibrium provided that the
























where (14) ensures that ￿rms prefer to export to the markets in the opposite region than to establish
subsidiaries there and (15) ensures that ￿rms prefer to operate as regional multinationals than as
exporters or as global multinationals. In addition, we need the condition for high costs of FDI
introduced in Section 4.
The discussion in this section points to two broad conclusions. First, we see that home-market
e⁄ects tend to drive the production of high-quality goods to the North and the production of
low-quality goods to the South. These patterns of specialization can be partial or complete. Our
analysis in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) established such predictions in a world with trade as the only
vehicle for foreign sales, but we see now that they apply as well when multinational investment
is possible. The costliness of trade and FDI give an advantage to ￿rms that enjoy a large home
market. Once biased entry occurs, these ￿rms will serve (some or all) foreign markets with exports
when transport costs are small relative to the costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries and will
serve these markets with subsidiary sales when the opposite is true.
Second, we ￿nd that the proximity-concentration tradeo⁄ biases the pattern of delivery toward
a preponderance of within-region FDI compared to cross-region FDI. Firms opt for subsidiaries
over exports when serving larger markets. If demands patterns are more similar within regions
than across regions, then having a large market at home tends to go hand in hand with having a
large market in other countries at a similar level of development. These forces imply that regional
multinationals are more likely to arise when di⁄erences in per capita income between regions are
large and the relative cost of FDI lies in some intermediate range. When the two regions have
su¢ ciently similar income distributions, global multinationals dominate regional FDI.
Since our model features trade and FDI in ￿nal consumer goods, it implies that trade and FDI
are substitutes; when a ￿rm chooses to serve a foreign market via subsidiary sales it does not export
21Figure 5: Trade and FDI with high ￿xed FDI costs
to that market, and when it chooses to export it does not engage in subsidiary sales. Under these
circumstances in a sector with large Linder-type FDI there is little Linder-type trade. In order to
avoid this feature of the model one can add intermediate inputs to the production of varieties of
the di⁄erentiated product. When these inputs are quality speci￿c, i.e., high-quality goods require
inputs that are not suitable for low-quality goods and vice versa, countries trade in intermediate
inputs both in the presence and in the absence of foreign direct investment. As a result, when a
￿rm chooses to serve a foreign market via subsidiary sales this decision substitutes for trade in ￿nal
goods but it increases trade in intermediate inputs, so that Linder-type trade does not necessarily
decline.12
5.2 North-South Income Gaps
We explore next how di⁄erences in per capita income in￿ uence the pattern of trade and investment.
We begin with a case with high costs of FDI, as in Figure 3, and a negligible di⁄erence in income
between North and South. As we have shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), a small income gap
gives rise to a trade equilibrium with production of low and high quality goods in all countries.
The initial equilibrium is at a point such as C in Figure 3 for both the high-quality segment and
the low-quality segment. The two Northern countries are net exporters of the high-quality goods
to the countries in the South, while the Southern countries are net exporters of the low-quality
goods in their trade with the North. Trade between countries in the same region is balanced in
each quality segment.
Now let the North-South income gap grow, while keeping aggregate world income constant. The
market for high-quality goods expands in the North, while that for low-quality goods expands in
the South. At some point, these di⁄erences in market size grow su¢ ciently large that production
12See, for example, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) who use a model in which only intermediate goods are
traded internationally.
22of low-quality goods cannot be sustained in the North, nor can production of high-quality goods
occur in the South. With specialization by region, the equilibrium in the high-quality segment
occurs at a point along BC in Figure 3, whereas that for the low-quality segment occurs along
CD. A still greater widening of the income gap can make FDI attractive for regional sales. For
example, the equilibrium in the market for low-quality goods can reach a point such as D, where
Southern ￿rms are indi⁄erent between serving the other Southern market with exports or from a
foreign subsidiary. Finally, for a su¢ ciently large income gap, the equilibrium can have all ￿rms in
one or both quality segments operating as regional multinationals.
Figure 5 plots the numbers of varieties at each quality level produced in a typical Northern
country and in a typical Southern country as functions of the di⁄erence in mean income between
the two regions for a parameterized example. In this example, the relative cost of FDI is high
in the low-quality segment, but prohibitive in the high-quality segment. In generating the ￿gure,
we have assumed that income in each country is distributed according to a Gamma distribution
with mean yR
m in the North and yP
m in the South. The di⁄erence in mean incomes is plotted along
the horizontal axis, with the aggregate world income held constant throughout. The lines labeled
n
x;k
q represents the number of ￿rms entering in quality segment q in one of the countries of region




H for k = R;P. For











L , where n
x;P
L represents the number of ￿rms that operate as
exporters of low-quality goods in the typical Southern country while n
s;P
L is the number of regional
multinationals with foreign subsidiaries producing low-quality goods in the South.13
The ￿gure shows that all countries produce in both quality segments when the income gap
is small. Also, for small di⁄erences in mean income, all markets are served by exports. In this
example, producers of high-quality goods do not operate foreign subsidiaries for any of the mean
income di⁄erences shown in the ￿gure. As the income gap widens, the number of high-quality brands
produced in the North rises, while that in the South falls, until the latter eventually declines to
zero. For a large enough di⁄erence in mean income, the home-market advantage of the North in
high-quality products spells an end to production in the South.
A widening of the income gap also leads to greater specialization in the market for low-quality
goods. As the gap grows, the size of the market for low-quality products grows in the South and
shrinks in the North. Correspondingly, the number of low-quality products produced by Southern
￿rms expands and the number of such products produced by Northern ￿rms shrinks. Once produc-
tion of low-quality disappears in the North, further increases in the income gap eventually generate
a change in the mode of delivery by Southern ￿rms. Regional multinationals spring into existence
in the South and initially coexist with Southern ￿rms that operate solely as exporters. There is a
range of income di⁄erences for which regional multinationals and exporters coexist in the market
for low-quality goods, corresponding to an equilibrium at point D in Figure 3. When the income
13The parameters used to generate the ￿gure are fL = 1:5; fH = 5; cL = 0:05; cH = 0:3; qL = 0:9; qH = 1:05;
￿L = 0:5; ￿H = 0:7; x
s
L=xL = 1=5; x
s
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gap grows still larger, the Southern exporters disappear and all ￿rms headquartered there operate
as South-to-South multinationals.
Next consider a case with low ￿xed costs of FDI, such as is depicted in Figure 4. When the
North-South income gap is tiny, the markets for a given quality of good are almost the same size
in the four countries. The equilibrium features global multinationals that could be headquartered
anywhere. Then, as the income gap grows, the equilibrium in the market for high-quality goods
moves toward point B in Figure 4, while that in the market for low-quality goods moves toward
point D. At point B, both global multinationals (located anywhere) and regional multinationals
in the North earn zero pro￿ts producing high-quality goods, so both types of ￿rms can coexist.
At point D, regional multinationals in the South and global multinationals break even producing
low-quality goods. For large enough di⁄erences in mean income levels, the high-quality segment has
an equilibrium along AB, with regional (North-to-North) multinationals operating in the North,
and no production in the South. Similarly, the low-quality segment has an equilibrium along DE,
with regional (South-to-South) multinationals operating in the South, and no production in the
North.
Figure 6 depicts a parameterized example of this.14 In this example, the relative cost of FDI
is low in both quality segments. The example con￿rms the presence of global multinationals for
small and moderate di⁄erences in mean incomes. As we have noted previously, the model does
not determine where these ￿rms are headquartered, but nor does that outcome matter for any
of the aggregate variables. As the di⁄erence in mean income grows, the structure of the market
for low-quality products evolves. For a moderate income gap, ￿rms in the South are indi⁄erent
between serving the North with exports and opening foreign subsidiaries there. There is a deter-
minate number of global multinationals￿ labeled n
g
L￿ that may be located in the North or in the
14The parameters for this example are fL = 1:5; fH = 5; cL = 0:05; cH = 0:3; qL = 0:9; qH = 1:05; ￿L = 0:5;
￿H = 0:7; x
s
L=xL = 0:2; x
s





24South. But the equilibrium has, as well, a determinate number of regional multinationals that
must be headquartered in the South; this number is depicted by the dotted curve, n
s;P
L , where
the superscripts indicate that these are regional subsidiaries involving South-to-South FDI. This
number expands as the income gap widens, until eventually these regional multinationals replace
the global multinationals entirely.
5.3 Market Size
In this section, we examine the relationship between overall market size and patterns of trade and
FDI. We capture market size in a country by the parameter Nk, which represents the number of
households that purchases a unit of some variety of di⁄erentiated product. In general, an increase
in market size in a country or region tends to provide absolute advantages across all di⁄erentiated
goods thanks to the home-market e⁄ect. The advantage of rich countries in the high-quality segment
grows even larger when the overall size of the market for di⁄erentiated products expands relative
to that in the South. Moreover, when Northern markets are larger than Southern markets, ￿rms
in the North may begin to capture world markets for low-quality goods as well. As before, we
are specially concerned with ￿nding conditions for the emergence of regional multinationals. We
explore both di⁄erences in size between North and South and asymmetries in size between the two
countries in a given region.
We begin with the case in which the pair of countries that comprise a region are similar in
size, but each country in the North is bigger than its counterpart in the South. We will start
from a con￿guration similar to that in the last section, where market sizes are identical across the
four countries but only income distributions di⁄er. From that starting point, we will examine the
implications of an increase in market size in the North. Take ￿rst the case in which the ￿xed cost
of FDI is high according to our previous taxonomy, so that Figure 3 applies. With reasonably high
shipping costs or su¢ ciently close income distributions, goods of both quality levels are produced
in all four countries. The equilibrium is at point C in both quality segments. As NR increases, the
size of the market expands in the North in all quality segments.15 The analysis in Fajgelbaum et. al.
(2011) indicates that, for a su¢ ciently large NR, production of all di⁄erentiated products migrates
to the North. In that case, the equilibrium lies on segment BC of Figure 3 for both quality segments,
but multinational investment does not occur. The North produces all di⁄erentiated products and
the South specializes in the homogenous good.
Further increases in NR drive the trade-only equilibrium in both quality segments towards point
B in Figure 3. Suppose that the equilibrium reaches this point ￿rst in the high-quality segment. In
such circumstances, the market size in each Northern country is so large that Northern ￿rms are
indi⁄erent between serving the other country in the same region via subsidiaries sales or exports.
Reasoning as in the previous section, we can infer that for a su¢ ciently large NR the equilibrium
must lie along segment AB. A similar logic applies to low-quality goods. Therefore, for su¢ ciently
large di⁄erences in market size between the two regions, regional multinationals emerge in the
15Note, from the de￿nition of d
k
j in (2), that N
k is part of the market potential in k.
25larger region, and they might do so in both quality segments. A similar logic applies when we start
from a case of low costs of FDI. Under such conditions, when we start from a situation of very
similarly-sized countries, we have global multinationals in both quality segments. As NR grows,
demands slide across BC towards the AB segment of Figure 4, whereupon regional multinationals
emerge.
In summary, asymmetries in market size between regions drive ￿rms operating in both quality
segments toward the larger region. When the di⁄erence in size between regions is su¢ ciently great,
regional multinationals emerge in the larger region. The logic underlying this outcome is common
to the case of both high and low costs of FDI. As the size of countries in one region increases, there
is necessarily entry of new ￿rms in both quality segments. In the case of high costs of FDI, these are
exporters who tend to be headquartered in the largest region, while in the case of low cost of FDI
they are global multinationals that can be headquartered anywhere in the world. This worldwide
increase in the number of ￿rms necessarily increases competition in the region whose market size is
not growing, driving down market potentials. When the number of consumers becomes su¢ ciently
large in the expanding region, the size of the market in the other region is too small for ￿rms
headquartered there to break even. In the limit, as the number of ￿rms keeps rising, market
potentials approximate zero in the region with the ￿xed population. Since the equilibrium must lie
on the contours de￿ned in Figures 2 to 3, regional multinationals must arise if costs of FDI are not
prohibitive.
We study next the e⁄ects of size di⁄erences within a region. Suppose that the two Northern
countries are similar in size, while, in the South, country P1 has a larger population than country
P2. The two countries in each region share the same distribution of income. We are interested in
examining how the division of population between P1 and P2 a⁄ects the patterns of FDI and trade.
To this end, let NP1 = N + ￿ and let NP2 = N ￿ ￿, where N = NR1 = NR2 and ￿ ￿ 0. This
speci￿cation makes the two regions equal in size for any value of ￿. We begin from a situation
in which, when ￿ = 0 (so that all countries have the same population size) there is only North-
to-North and South-to-South FDI. Northern multinationals specialize in high-quality products and
Southern multinationals specialize in low-quality products. For concreteness we focus on the case
in which the costs of FDI are high, so that the equilibrium lies on segment AB of Figure 4 for
high-quality products, and on segment DE of that ￿gure for low-quality products.
When ￿ = 0, as we showed in Section 5.1, the equilibrium conditions (12) and (13) determine
the total numbers of high-quality and low-quality products, ￿ nH and ￿ nL, but the numbers of ￿rms
with headquarters in each country is not determined. Firms that produce high-quality goods might
be based either in R1 or R2 and ￿rms that produce low-quality goods might be headquartered in
either P1 or P2. In this equilibrium along AB of Figure 4, (14) and (15) must be satis￿ed; that is,
the ￿rms in either region ￿nd it optimal to export to the opposite, but to serve the other country
in their own region with sales from a foreign subsidiary.
Now suppose that P1 is slightly larger than P2; i.e., ￿ > 0, but ￿ is small. Inasmuch as the
two Southern countries share the same income distribution and the same prices, the movement of a
26representative sample of households from P2 to P1 has no a⁄ect on aggregate demand and therefore
no e⁄ect on the incentives for ￿rms to enter as producers of low-quality goods in the South or as
producers of high-quality goods in the North. A small increase in ￿ from ￿ = 0 leaves ￿ nH and ￿ nL
unchanged, and the location of the ￿rms￿headquarters in a given region remains indeterminate.16
This argument requires, of course, that the asymmetry in population sizes creates no incentive for
any ￿rm to alter its mode of serving any market. That is, ￿rms in each region must continue to
prefer serving the opposite country in their own region with subsidiary sales and the markets in
the opposite region with export sales despite the altered distribution of consumer location. This















q is per capita demand for the product with quality q in country k in the equilibrium with
equal-sized countries.
But note that a su¢ ciently large ￿ will cause (16) or (17) to be violated. As country P1 grows
large and P2 small, either ￿rms headquartered in P1 will prefer to serve the small market P2 with
exports, or ￿rms in the North will prefer to serve the large market in P1 from a subsidiary located
there. Suppose, for example, that (N + ￿)dP
H < xs
H=(1 ￿ ￿H) but (N ￿ ￿)dP
L < xs
L=(1 ￿ ￿L).
Then Southern ￿rms in P1 prefer to export to P2 rather than to invest in a subsidiary there, and
these ￿rms enjoy a cost advantage by dint of their large home market compared to ￿rms in P2.
Production of low-quality goods concentrates in the larger of the two Southern markets and ￿rms
there export to all foreign markets.
Figure 7 illustrates this in a parametrized example.17 The horizontal axis shows the di⁄erence in
population size between the two countries in the Southern region. The ￿gure shows the number of
￿rms of the various types as a function of ￿. For small enough di⁄erences in size, the equilibrium
has only regional multinationals. The curve labeled n
s;P
L shows the number of these producing
low-quality products in the South and that labeled n
s;R
H shows the number producing high-quality
products in the North. As consumers migrate from P2 to P1, country P1 attains a size that makes
it pro￿table to sell high-quality products from local subsidiaries there. A new type of Northern
multinational emerges that has subsidiaries in the other market of the North and in P1, but not
in P2. As P1 continues to grow at the expense of P2, the number of such multinationals (labeled
m
s;R
H ) increases while the number of regional multinationals declines. Eventually, it also becomes
16This argument requires that the cost of producing a unit of output in a foreign subsidiary literally is the same as
at home. If production near to headquarters generates even a tiny cost di⁄erential, this would create a home-market
advantage for the ￿rms headquartered in country P1 and this country would capture all of the producers of the
low-quality good.
17The parameters for this example are fL = 1; fH = 6; cL = 0:05; cH = 0:3; qL = 0:9; qH = 1:05; ￿L = 0:6;
￿H = 0:6; x
s
L=xL = 0:2; x
s
H=xH = 0:2; ￿L = 0:4; ￿H = 0:46; N = 500; y
P
m = 5 and y
R
m = 50.
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optimal for ￿rms in P2 to close their subsidiaries in P1 and to instead serve the small market for
low-quality products with export sales. The number of ￿rms located in P1 that export to all foreign
markets is denoted in the ￿gure by n
x;P1
L . For large enough di⁄erences in size between P1 and P2,
there is no FDI by Northern or Southern ￿rms in the latter market.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have combined a product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis with a proximity-
concentration view of ￿rms￿decisions about how to serve their foreign markets. We conjectured that
non-homothetic preferences and home-market e⁄ects, which are known to a⁄ect patterns of world
trade, should in￿ uence patterns of foreign direct investment as well. The tradeo⁄between proximity
and concentration implies that ￿rms are more likely to serve foreign markets from local production
facilities when those markets are large. Non-homothetic preferences for vertically di⁄erentiated
products forge a connection between a country￿ s income level and distribution and the mix of
qualities it consumes. Accordingly, country income and product quality are bound to in￿ uence
￿rms￿choices between foreign investment and international trade. We have extended the model
in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) to allow for a¢ liate sales by multinational corporations and used the
extended model to examine the circumstances under which ￿rms in a country will choose to serve
some foreign markets by exports and others by subsidiary sales.
Our analysis establishes a systematic bias in FDI toward countries at a similar stage of de-
velopment. In a simple setting that allows for both regional and cross-regional FDI, we ￿nd that
North-North FDI or South-South FDI must occur in any equilibrium that features multinational
investment. Moreover, if the income distribution in each Northern country dominates that in each
Southern country, multinationals from the North specialize in producing high-quality products
while multinationals from the South specialize in producing low-quality products. For given ￿xed
28costs of FDI, regional multinationals are more likely to arise the more disparate are the income
distributions of the two regions. In keeping with the empirical evidence, the share of foreign a¢ liate
sales in total sales falls with the di⁄erence in per capita income between trading partners.
Our analysis provides an explanation for the fact that multinational sales are more responsive
to income gaps than export sales, as documented for the United States by Brainard (1997). It is
also consistent with the new evidence we have provided, using Ramondo￿ s (2011) data on multi-
national activity in a broad sample of countries, that ￿rms direct their FDI disproportionately to
countries with per capita income levels similar to their home market. In our model, FDI is more
common across countries with similar income levels, because such countries tend to specialize their
production of goods of similar quality. Our analysis also suggests a potential contributing factor
in the recent surge in South-to-South FDI. For example, we ￿nd that the rise in multinational
activity that naturally follows from a decline in the cost of establishing foreign subsidiaries has a
distinctive pattern: ￿rms ￿rst locate foreign subsidiaries in markets that are similar to their home
market before choosing to serve very di⁄erent markets in this manner. Moreover, we ￿nd that
smaller asymmetries in market size within regions are more conducive to regional FDI. Therefore,
the convergence of China and India toward the income levels of other emerging-market countries
might also account for part of the recent growth in South-to-South FDI.
Our model is the ￿rst, so far as we know, to address the pattern of FDI across multiple countries
with di⁄erent levels of per capita income. We have proposed a particular mechanism by which
income may in￿ uence ￿rms￿choices of which markets to serve by exports and which from foreign
subsidiaries. The theory based on consumers￿non-homothetic preferences for goods of di⁄erent
quality indeed is consistent with the aggregate data on multinational activity. But additional
research using more disaggregated data is needed to determine whether non-homothetic demands
and vertical product di⁄erentiation play the role that we ascribe to them.
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